The Warren Court also acknowledged the importance of congressional protection of rights. That Court showed a remarkable amount of restraint towards congressional power, especially when Congress used that power to protect rights of belonging, those rights that that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the national community and facilitate equal membership in that community.
This article has implications for the political debate, in which supporters of rights of belonging often find ourselves championing courts as the protectors of those rights. It also sheds light on the ongoing debate among constitutional scholars over "popular constitutionalism," in which skeptics argue that judicial review is necessary for the protection of minority rights. Both arguments are based on a misunderstanding of the historical relationship between courts, Congress and rights of belonging, and a misunderstanding of the Warren Court's role in that history. Understanding the judicial restraint of the Warren Court will help to open up a necessary political debate over the scope and meaning of our rights of belonging.
Court's legacy reveals that that Court's approach to equality rights was considerably more complex than this paradigm suggests. There is another side to the Warren Court legacy -that Court's deference towards congressional power. In a series of landmark decisions articulating its deference to Congress, the Warren Court invited and encouraged popular constitutionalism, enabling members of Congress to use their own judgment in defining and protecting minority rights. 9 In this essay, I argue that the strongest contribution that the Warren Court made to expanding equality rights was not its judicial activism in protecting those rights, but its restraint in allowing Congress to protect those rights.
The Warren Court era saw a marked expansion of "rights of belonging," those rights that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the national community and facilitate equal membership in that community. 10 Based in equality, rights of belonging help to define and expand access to the community in which we live by removing barriers to participation in that community. 11 Both critics and supporters of the Warren Court often attribute the expansion of these rights to that Court, whether condemning the Court CONSTITUTION (1989) . 11 For example, civil rights legislation opens access to employment, education, and other opportunities, and the right to join a union empowers workers to participate in their workplace and in the political arena. In contrast, liberty interests, like the right to family autonomy and freedom of speech, in and of themselves are not rights of belonging. However, liberty-based rights can implicate equality-based rights. For example, the right to marry is a liberty interest, rooted in individual autonomy, but it becomes an equality interest when it is denied to one group of people based on immutable characteristics. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) . This article does not attempt to define all rights of belonging, nor would it be possible to do so. The focus of this article is on the process of definition -indeed, participating in defining rights of belonging is itself an act of belonging. See ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 5 at Ch. 8.
for illegitimately imposing its own will on the democratic process or praising the Justices of the Warren Court as "countermajoritarian heroes" protecting rights of minorities.
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Yet while the Warren Court certainly was protective of rights of belonging, the Warren Court's restraint towards Congress enabled that body to be equally protective of those rights. Indeed, from the 1964 Civil Rights Act to the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, Congress gave those rights more protections than did federal courts.
Warren Court decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education 13 provide support for the argument that judicial activism is necessary for the adequate protection of rights of belonging. Inspired by the Warren Court, many scholars have argued that an active judiciary is necessary for the adequate protection of minority rights. 14 Yet the little known and understood truth is that throughout the history of our country, proponents of rights of belonging have been more successful with politics than with litigation.
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Judicial restraint, not judicial activism, has always been necessary for the healthy development of rights of belonging in this country. 16 Not only has the Court rarely acted to protect rights of belonging as the Warren Court did, but it has also rarely allowed 12 See, e. 14 A recent Lexis search uncovered 506 law review articles written in the past twenty years advocating the proposition that courts should protect minorities against the will of the majority. For just a few of the many prominent scholars supporting this view, see KARST, supra note 4 at 9;; Charles L. Black, Jr., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 125 (1997); Judith Baer, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 281 (1983) . 15 For a detailed account of this phenomenon, see REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 5. 16 Id. congressional efforts to protect those rights. 17 Understanding this, prior to the Warren Court Era progressives consistently advocated for judicial restraint, not judicial activism.
Since the Warren Court era, the Supreme Court has returned to its activist ways in its relationship to Congress, striking down congressional efforts to define and protect rights of belonging.
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In contrast to the Warren Court's deference to congressional power, the Rehnquist 
II. Judicial Activism and Rights of Belonging
In today's political debate, the term "judicial activism" has become so overused as to be practically meaningless. 27 Politicians and pundits seem to invoke the term whenever they disagree with a court's decision. 28 Hence, it is important to define the term at the outset. Black's Law Dictionary defines "judicial activism" as " Of course, this discussion of judicial activism and restraint is arguably beside the point to those who are most concerned about rights of minorities. Sure, they argue, ideally both courts and Congress act to protect rights of belonging, 43 and proponents of those rights should only resort to courts when they fail in the political process. But sometimes it is necessary for judges to intervene in that process in order to insure that it works, and often this intervention is needed on behalf of minorities. 44 However, while this theory makes sense in the abstract, it is not borne out by our history. 45 Minorities often lose in courts, and they tend to win in the political process far more often than this standard paradigm suggests. More importantly, when minorities win and convince legislatures to create rights of belonging, those victories should be entitled to the maximum amount of deference. Yet with the exception of the Warren Court, activist courts have often refused to defer to the legislative victories of minorities.
B. Judicial Activism's Impact on Congress' Enduring Role as a Protector of Rights of Belonging 41 KECK, supra note 2 at 21. 42 The standard response to my call for judicial restraint is that when the Court strikes down a legislative act, it acts with the authority to enforce the people's will embodied in the Constitution. See Young, supra note 19 at 1146, citing, e.g., ELY, supra note 9 at 8-9. However, this argument is less persuasive when one considers that Congress is also interpreting the constitution when it legislates, especially when it legislates to protect fundamental rights like rights of belonging. what is at stake in the debate over judicial activism is not just the proper relationship between courts and legislatures, but the scope of our rights to belong to the national community.
Reconstruction
Members of the Reconstruction Congress enacted the 13 th , 14 th and 15 th Amendments to end slavery and protect the rights of freed slaves and other persons 46 Of course, Congress has also often remained inactive in the face of societal injustice. The most notable example of this inaction is Congress' failure to enact legislation to address race discrimination in the Jim Crow Era from the end of Reconstruction until the late 1950s. For a detailed discussion of this period, see MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004). For an in-depth discussion of congressional action and inaction during this period, see ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 5 at Chapters 3-6. 47 Id. 48 See U.S.CONST. Amends. XIII (abolishing slavery and giving Congress the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"); XIV; XV (prohibiting the federal government and states from denying the right to vote on account of race and giving Congress the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"); XIX (prohibiting the denial of the right to vote on account of sex and giving Congress the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"); XXIII (bestowing the right to vote for president on residents of the District of Columbia and giving Congress the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"); XXIV (prohibiting the use of poll taxes as a voting qualification and giving Congress the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"); XXVI (lowering the voting age to eighteen and giving Congress the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"). 49 Indeed, it is the Warren Court's deference to congressional power to protect rights of belonging, and not the Rehnquist Court's activism against that power, that is the historical anomaly.
within their jurisdiction. All of these amendments contained enforcement provisions 136 President Johnson introduced the Voting Rights Act only a week after the violence of the voting rights march in Selma, Alabama, was televized nationally, and a Gallup Poll showed that 50% of Americans felt that the most important issue in the country was civil rights. POWE, supra note 3 at 257.
districts. 137 The blanket prohibition of literacy tests was arguably inconsistent with the Court's earlier ruling in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, that literacy tests are not per se unconstitutional, because the statute did not require a finding of intentional discrimination before the tests would be outlawed. 138 South Carolina argued that to allow Congress to enact such a bill would rob the courts of their rightful constitutional role, but the Court disagreed.
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren noted that the Framers had intended Congress to be "chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in Section One." Thus, he concluded, "in addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting." 139 The only question was whether the legislation was a rational means to effectuate this constitutional prohibition. 140 Noting that Section Five was intended to give Congress the "same broad powers 143 Id. 144 Only Justice Black filed a partial dissent, objecting to the part of the opinion upholding the provisions of the Act that required certain state to ask for pre-clearance from the Attorney General before they could use qualifying devices like literacy tests. See Id. at 355-362 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting 194 Ignoring Congress' characterization of the law as a civil rights measure, the Court framed the statute as a "family law" measure and held that it was beyond the Commerce Clause because it regulated activity that was not economic. 195 Even more striking, the Court breezily disregarded Congress' factual record, noting merely "the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation." Rights of belonging serve to shape and define our community. The reason why the "moral values" message of the political right has been so successful is that people naturally yearn for shared values and a shared sense of community. 214 Those on the left should also be speaking about their values and emphasizing the importance of community -a community that is more inclusive and is based on a more expansive vision of who belongs to it. 215 This must be done in the political arena, and cannot be confined to courts. Because courts are by and large external to that community, they are less well suited to define it. 216 Moreover, the litigation process, with its jurisdictional barriers and limited fact-finding capabilities, is simply not as effective a forum for debating fundamental values as is the open-ended political process. 217 Congressional protection of rights of belonging also enjoys a number of institutional advantages over court protection of those rights, including accountability, transparency, enforceability and flexibility in creating remedies. 218 Most importantly, the political process entails an open debate in which diverse groups can participate and furthers the agency of political actors, including grass roots activists. 219 The act of engaging in the political debate is itself an act of belonging, and can be extremely empowering for those who have historically been excluded or marginalized. 220 The members of the Warren Court recognized the importance of political engagement and allowed a great deal of latitude for members of Congress to resolve the most pressing moral issues of their time -the scope and meaning of rights of belonging.
Yet, for some reason, this wisdom has been lost and obscured in the conventional understanding of the Warren Court Era, by those on both sides of the political Warren Court. The time has come to appreciate the value of that Court's restraint.
VII. Conclusion
The view of the Warren Court as an activist protector of minority rights has become the conventional paradigm of the relationship between courts and legislatures with regard to rights of belonging. While the Warren Court's defense of rights of belonging was certainly admirable, that role was neither paradigmatic of how courts operate in our constitutional system, nor does it tell the whole story about that Court.
Minorities must resort to courts when the political process fails them. Still, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment saw Congress as the primary protector of those rights, and based on that understanding, the Warren Court allowed Congress to play that role.
Appreciating the restraint of the Warren Court is necessary not only to set the record straight, but also to reinvigorate the enduring role that Congress has played in protecting rights of belonging throughout the history of our country. Once we understand that Congress, and not the Court, is both the most likely and the best suited institution to protect those rights, then we can begin to engage in the political debate that is necessary for a robust model of rights of belonging in our society. The Warren Court recognized the value of this political debate -we should too.
